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208 abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of corruption control depending upon whe-
ther the bribe taker or the bribe giver initiates the corrupt interaction. The proba-
bility of corrupt exchanges depends upon the bribe and the corrupt market struc-
ture. The probability of apprehension is set but punishment can be influenced via 
bribes. Results show that the effectiveness of apprehension hinges on whether hi-
gher bribes invite harsher fines. Competition for favors intimidates the bribe giver 
into offering lower bribes, while greater agency competition has a similar effect 
on the bribe demanded. Consistent with intuition, better paid bureaucrats demand 
smaller bribes. Some implications for anti-corruption policy are discussed.
Keywords: corruption, bribe takers, bribe givers, competition, probability, 
penalty
1 introduction
Attention to corruption has heightened in recent years among researchers, po-
licymakers and the general public (see Aidt, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2006; Svensson, 
2005; Treisman, 2007). This has occurred due to advances in information gathe-
ring and transmission mechanisms leading to greater awareness about corruption 
and to the relative ease of conducting empirical research. Some nations, such as 
transition countries and those endowed with certain natural resources, face special 
challenges in corruption control. However, formal research on corruption, espe-
cially at the micro-level, has lagged behind empirical macro analyses (Treisman, 
2007). 
This paper attempts to add to the literature by examining relative interactions be-
tween bribe givers (or favor seekers) and bribe takers (or government officials/
bureaucrats). The novelty is in alternately examining whether bribe takers or bribe 
givers move first in initiating corrupt deals and the consequent impact on the mag-
nitude of bribes or the severity of corruption. The focus of this paper also enables 
us to study whether the predetermined value of the corrupt “reward” makes a dif-
ference to corruption – when the bureaucrat solicits the bribe, the value of the li-
cense or permit is likely clear; on the other hand, when the bribe payer moves first 
by offering a bribe, the value of the favor sought is less likely to be preset. For 
instance, once the bureaucrat accepts the corrupt offer (or reveals that he’s willing 
to “deal”), he could potentially offer a range of favors – a better job than the one 
sought for a higher bribe, admission to a better government college, etc. Under-
standing of the size of bribes should aid in understanding of the type of corruption 
– whether it is “petty” or “grand” – and, from a policy perspective, has equity and 
distributional implications.
Corruption can take many forms. Two common forms involve collusion among 
corrupt government officials and bribe givers, while extortion involves rent-ex-
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209might determine whether the bribe taker or the bribe giver initiates a corrupt deal. 
For instance, the first mover in corrupt relations might be determined by the rela-
tive discount rates of the two parties, relative bargaining positions, degree of com-
petition, socio-cultural norms, etc. (see Hunt, 2006; Lambsdorff and Teksoz, 
2004; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). These factors also influence the magnitude or the 
size of bribes. For example, under collusion in corruption, either the bribe giver or 
the bribe taker might move first by offering to collude with the other party to mis-
state performance (e.g., an inspector approaching a government contractor to ap-
prove a substandard dam as meeting standards in exchange for a bribe or the 
contractor approaching the inspector to obtain the same outcome) or to obtain/
offer favors out of turn (e.g., expedited housing permits; early approval of loan 
applications from public sector banks, etc.). Extortion in corruption occurs when 
government officials with monopoly powers move first by setting prices for their 
services (e.g., when they hold monopolies on the award of licenses; sanctioning 
eligibility for job promotions, etc.). Bureaucrats could also set price tags for per-
forming routine services “after hours” – issuing licenses on weekends. These situ-
ations might also occur in hierarchical bureaucracies where officials have “hold-
up” powers (Mishra, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The scenarios envisioned in 
the formal model below are consistent with these situations and exhibit many 
prevalent forms of corruption; however, we cannot claim to cover all possible in-
teractions between bribe givers and bribe takers (see Bertrand et al., 2007; Cadot, 
1987; Guriev, 2004 and Manion, 1996) for examples of alternate settings. For in-
stance, while we do not explicitly model information asymmetries across bribe 
takers and bribe givers, unaware bribe givers might offer bribes to obtain services 
that they are routinely entitled to (see Manion, 1996).
As with other forms of illegal activity, the first mover in corruption (a favor se eker 
or a favor giver) is uncertain whether the proposal to engage in a corrupt deal 
would be accepted by the other party. Favor seekers might initiate bribe offers to 
gain preferential treatment (e.g., obtaining expedited or undeserving services) but 
they run the risk of their bribe offer being rejected for being too low or the poten-
tial recipient (government official) being honest.1 Bertrand et al. (2007), Goel 
(2005), Guriev (2004), Lambsdorff (2002) and Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2004) 
have noted issues related to formation of corrupt relations (also see Andrianova, 
2001). Larger bribe offers, ceteris paribus, could also induce greater scrutiny and 
harsher penalties. This is illustrated in figure 1, where the bribe giver is unsure 
whether the potential recipient (government official) is corrupt or honest. Exam-
ples include favor seekers bribing to obtain underage driving licenses (see Ber-
trand et al., 2007) for an interesting experiment related to corruption in the award 
of driving licenses) or to acquire false identifications.
1 While instances involving qualification requirements of potential bribe givers (e.g., driver license seekers 
(Bertrand et al., 2007), job or admissions seekers) are not explicitly modeled in our setting, one could envi-
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210 On the other hand, government officials, especially those with some monopoly 
powers in the disbursement of favors, might initiate corrupt deals by putting a 
“price tag” on different services (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1999).2 For instance, 
officials might drag their feet (increase red tape (see Guriev, 2004)) to grant ap-
provals for pollution permits or property registration deeds. They too have to do a 
cost-benefit calculation – high bribe demands might induce some potential favor 
seekers to operate in the shadow economy or go to different (competing) govern-
ment agencies (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rose-Acker-
man, 1999); also, higher bribe demands might invite greater scrutiny and harsher 
penalties. Figure 2 shows the different steps when the bribe taker bureaucrat 
moves first. In this instance, the government official moving first by setting prices 
for services offered is unsure whether a corrupt deal would eventually materialize. 
figure 1

















Note: J = payoff; B = bribe offer; P = probability of corrupt deal; γ = probability of apprehe-
nsion; δ = penalty.
Both bribe givers and bribe takers in corrupt deals have to contend with the chanc-
es of getting caught and, upon apprehension, the expected punishment for corrup-
tion – apprehension without credible punishment is not very effective (see Baner-
jee, 1997; Becker, 1968; Becker and Stigler, 1974; La Porta et al., 1999; 2004). 
These apprehension chances (probability of getting caught) and punishment might 
be set (exogenous) or the judicial mechanism itself might be corrupt (Benson, 
1988; Goel and Nelson, 2007; Mookherjee and Png, 1995; Priks, 2011). In our 
2 This scenario is similar to the case of a corrupt auction by a monopolist bureaucrat. Some scholars have 
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211analysis, the detection rates and punishments are assumed to be the same whether 
the bribe taker or the bribe giver moves first – the anti-corruption bodies in charge 
of checking corruption are mainly interested in reducing corruption and are gener-
ally less concerned with (or largely unable to detect) who initiated the corrupt 
deal. 
figure 2 














Note: S = bureaucrat’s salary; b = bribe demanded; ρ = probability of corrupt deal; γ = proba-
bility of apprehension; δ = penalty.
Besides contributing to the literature, this work has some policy value – in the 
absence of the ability to eradicate corruption entirely, under what conditions can 
government actions make corruption less severe (by reducing the magnitude of 
bribes)? The severity of corruption is the other dimension of corruption research 
that has mainly focused on the prevalence of corruption. The magnitude of bribes 
strikes at fairness issues associated with corruption – lower bribes make corrupt 
acts affordable to a larger set of potential favor seekers. The formal model fol-
lows.
2 the model
We consider two scenarios – allowing the bribe giver (denoted by superscript g) 
and the bribe taker (denoted by superscript T) alternately to initiate the corrupt 
deal, each party unaware whether the offer would be acceptable to the other party.3 
3 Both the giver and taker are assumed to have similar attitudes towards risk and are assumed, for analytical 
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212 The probability of apprehension or detection for corrupt acts, γ, is exogenous – the 
bribe taker and the bribe giver are unable to influence their chances of being ap-
prehended. However, the severity of punishment for corrupt acts once caught, δ, 
is sensitive to the size of the bribe (both bribe offered and bribe received). In a 
largely corrupt economy with a corrupt judiciary, the derivative of δ with respect 
to the bribe would be negative, but it would be positive when the authorities have 
a zealous attitude towards eliminating corruption and it would be zero in a case in 
which the punishment is set – akin to a per se illegality clause. The punishment 
can be a monetary fine or it may be thought of as the monetized (present-disco-
unted) value of incarceration (alternately, demotion or suspension from a job). 
The probability of detection is determined by the efficacy of policing, while cor-
rections and judicial employment determine and enforce penalties.4 See figures 1 
and 2 for various scenarios facing the bribe giver and the bribe taker, respectively. 
2.1 supply-push bribery: bribe giver moves first
In this instance the bribe giver or the favor seeker initiates the corrupt deal by of-
fering a bribe. The paper by Guriev (2004) examines a related, somewhat nar-
rower, aspect where a bribe is offered to a bureaucrat to reduce the degree of red 
tape. The bribe offer is denoted by B > 0 and is assumed to be one-shot or a one-
stop corrupt shop of the corrupt bureaucrat.5 Potential payoff from the corrupt deal 
is denoted by J, such that J(B), JB > 0, JBB < 0, and J(0) = 0. In other words, larger 
bribes can increase the payoffs and there are no corrupt returns without bribe of-
fers – the corrupt payoffs are contingent upon successful corrupt contracts. J > B 
makes engaging in corrupt activity worthwhile for the giver and it follows then 
that JB > 1 – i.e., the marginal return to a bribe is greater than one. The payoffs 
might include awarding oil-drilling rights to firms who are not qualified or giving 
construction permits to blacklisted contractors, etc. Larger bribes, for example, 
might enable one to procure rights to larger, more lucrative drilling tracts.
The giver is unaware whether the bribe would be acceptable to the government 
official – not all government officials are corrupt. Let P denote the probability that 
the bribe offer will be accepted by the government official. Higher bribe offers 
increase the chances of acceptance PB > 0, and PBB < 0. To introduce competition 
for favors, the probability P is also dependent on the given number of favor seek-
ers (N), such that a giver’s probability of striking a corrupt deal diminishes with 
more seekers (PN < 0, and PNN ≥ 0).6 The cross-effects term PBN might be positive, 
negative or zero depending upon whether the competition for favors increases, 
decreases or leaves unchanged the marginal effect of a bribe on the probability of 
a successful deal.
4 Goel and Nelson (2007) empirically consider the relative effects of these types of government employment 
on corruption in the United States. Also see Alt and Lassen (2008).
5 A dynamic analysis with multiple points of bribe payoffs would involve a much more complex analysis that 
could also allow for the possibility of a bureaucratic hold-up at some stage(s) of the process. 
6 One specific functional form that satisfies the marginal conditions is P = Bα/N, with 0 < α < 1. Further, one 
could alternately have the bribe offer depend directly on the number of givers, although that would require 
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213Given this background, the bribe giver tries to maximize the payoff from the one-
shot bribe offer by weighing the relative costs and benefits of success. The ex-
pected payoff (πg) is the sum of expected net returns from striking a corrupt deal, 
which are the sum of expected payoff (loss) from detection and consequent pun-
ishment, PγB(–δ), and the payoff from escaping detection, P(1–γ)(J–B); minus the 
penalties in case of no deal, δB(1–P). It is assumed that the deal falls through 
mainly because the government official is honest (or pretends to be so because the 
bribe is too low) and all honest officials report the bribe giver to the appropriate 
authorities.7 Figure 1 illustrates the options of the bribe giver. 
Formally, the bribe giver chooses the bribe size B to maximize payoff πg
max πg  = P{γB(–δ) + (1 – γ)(J – B)} – δB(1 – P)
B
 = P(J – B)(1 – γ) – δBz1)   (1)
    [J > B → (1 – JB) < 0; z1 ≡ {Pγ + (1–P)} > 0] 
Simplification of the corresponding first-order condition (πgB = 0) yields
B* = [[(1–γ){JPB + P(JB – 1)}] – δz1]/[PB(1–γ) + δBz1 + δPB(γ–1)] (2)
Recognizing that, given the general functional forms used here, B* is not in a re-
duced form, a sufficient condition for B* to be positive requires δB ≥ 0; δ < 1; and 
δ < (1–γ)[JPB + P(JB – 1)]/z1. In other words, for a positive bribe offer to be forth-
coming, the potential punishment should be relatively low.
Further, sufficient condition for satisfaction of the second-order maximization 
condition (i.e., πgBB < 0) requires that δB ≥ 0; δBB ≥ 0; PBB ≤ 0; and εP ≡ PBB/P ≤ 
JBBB/2(JB –1).8 For a maximum, the punishment should be fixed or incremental 
and the probability of the deal should be somewhat inelastic or unresponsive to 
the bribe. Intuitively, from the bribe giver’s perspective, the probability of accep-
tance of the corrupt deal is likely to increase when the bureaucrat (bribe taker) is 
facing the end of her tenure due to retirement or a change in political leadership.9 
Then a small increase in the bribe offered would, ceteris paribus, be more likely 
to elicit a positive response from the official.
7 One could, without loss of generality, introduce another possibility in the model by introducing an exoge-
nous probability where the government official who rejects the bribe chooses to report the bribe giver. In a 
multi-period corrupt relation, the honest official might choose to not report the bribe offer in anticipation of a 
future corrupt deal or to not harm her “corrupt reputation”. The official might also reject and not report if an 
alternate bribe offer has been accepted – this aspect is somewhat captured by PN < 0.
8 In the special case P = Bα/N, εP = α.
9 Bureaucrats facing retirement could accept bribes when they play “end period games” with relatively less 
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214 We determine the comparative-static effects on the equilibrium bribe offers of 
changes in the number of bribe givers (N) and probability of detection (γ). How 
does the bribe offered respond to changes in the number of potential givers and 
detection rates?
2.1.1 effect of a change in competition for favors
Changes in the number of qualified bidders or increases in population can increase 
the competition for favors. A greater number of favor seekers induce some to offer 
bribes to jump the queue. By employing the implicit-function rule, the compara-
tive-static effect of a change in N is denoted by
(∂B/∂N) = – πgBN / πgBB  (3)
Given that the second-order condition is satisfied (i.e., πgBB < 0), the sign of 
(∂B/∂N) will be the sign of πgBN.
πgBN = PBN(1–γ)[(J – B) + Bδ] + PN(1–γ)[(JB – 1) + δ + BδB] (3A)
πgBN, and consequently, (∂B/∂N) would be negative when PBN ≤ 0.10 When the im-
pact of greater competition on the marginal probability of the deal is negative (PBN 
< 0) – i.e., greater competition dampens the marginal effect of a higher bribe on 
the probability of the deal, the optimal bribe offered declines with competition. 
Intuitively, greater competition sufficiently lowers the expected benefits (via a 
decrease in the likelihood of a corrupt deal) that the bribe giver is induced to offer 
a lower bribe. There is some empirical support for the competition for favors 
where studies of corruption determinants have included population as a regressor, 
although the statistical significance of the estimated effect is mixed (Fisman and 
Gatti, 2002; Glaeser and Saks, 2006).
2.1.2 effect of a change in the probability of detection
The chances of being caught for engaging in corrupt acts might change when new 
governments come to power with corruption control on their agendas or greater 
attention is paid to enforcement. International mandates might also induce nations 
to bolster their anti-corruption efforts. Further, technological advances, such as 
the Internet, might empower anti-corruption efforts by making it easier to detect 
corrupt acts as locational monitoring constraints are somewhat mitigated in the 
cyberspace. Proceeding in a fashion similar to that noted above, the effect of a 
change in the given probability of detection is given by
(∂B/∂γ) = – πgBγ / πgBB   (4)
Here  πBγ = – PB[(J – B) + Bδ] + P[(1 – JB) – δ – BδB] (4A)
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215πBγ would be negative when δB ≥ 0, or with the satisfaction of the second-order 
maximization conditions. Greater apprehension probability lowers the size of the 
bribe offered when the punishment is set (non-negotiable) or progressive.
We see that the magnitude of bribe offers is sensitive to the change in parameters. 
Under certain conditions, competition for favors lowers bribe offers. Apprehe-
nsion is effective in reducing bribe sizes when punishments are predetermined or 
progressive according to the magnitude of bribes. 
2.2 demand-pull bribery: bribe taker moves first
Now we shift focus to the bribe taker by allowing for explicit rent-extraction. 
Public officials with monopoly powers over disbursements of contracts and other 
favors are in a position to set bribes or prices for their services (e.g., see Cadot, 
1987). The solicited bribe is denoted by b and it affects the probability of the cor-
rupt deal ρ, which is also dependent upon the number of competing government 
agencies (n); i.e, ρ(b; n) and ρ(0; n) = 0.11 For instance, there may be more than 
one agency capable of awarding leases on government lands (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 1999). This occurs when government agencies 
have overlapping jurisdictions. Interestingly, the spread of the Internet has en-
abled some people to bypass government officials by conducting some govern-
ment business in cyberspace (see Goel et al., 2012). In this case, for a government 
official seeking a bribe, the presence of the Internet can be seen as a competing 
government agency that undermines his/her power to solicit a bribe.
Other things being the same, a higher bribe demand lowers the probability of a 
corrupt deal by making bribes unaffordable for some favor seekers (ρb < 0, with 
ρbb < 0), and greater agency competition lowers the bribe demanded (otherwise, an 
agency would lose to competing agencies) → ρn < 0, with ρnn ≥ 0. Further, there is 
no a priori good fix on the sign of the cross effects term ρbn – it could be positive, 
negative or zero. As noted above, the probability of detection (γ) and the severity 
of punishment (δ) are the same, irrespective of who initiates the corrupt deal.
In demanding a bribe, the bureaucrat has to weigh the expected benefits from a 
corrupt deal against the expected costs from detection and punishment. Failure to 
arrive at a deal can result in the corrupt bureaucrat being reported, resulting in the 
loss of the set bureaucratic (lawful) salary S. The reporting of the bureaucrat 
seems especially plausible in a one-period case considered because of the absence 
of a threat of future backlash. The bribe taker’s options are illustrated in figure 2. 
Formally, the bribe taker seeks to maximize πT by choosing the bribe demand (b), 
where
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216 max πT  = (1 – ρ)S(– δ) + ρ[γS(– δ) + (1– γ)(S + b)]
b  (5)
 = – Sδz2 + ρ(1– γ)(S + b) 
Where z2 ≡ [(1–ρ) + ργ] > 0.
Here (1 – ρ)S( – δ) is the expected payoff (loss) with no deal and (S + b)ρ[1 – γ] is 
the expected payoff when the corrupt deal is made and the bribe received, while 
ργ(– öS) is the penalty upon apprehension.
The corresponding first-order condition, πTb = 0, yields
b* = [S{ δbz2 – δρb(1–γ)} – (1–γ)(ρ + Sρb)]/(1–γ) ρb (6)
A positive bribe is demanded (b* > 0) when the bureaucrat’s salary is sufficiently 
low or when
S < ρ(1–γ)/[M – (1–γ)ρb];  where M ≡ δbz2 – δρb(1–γ) > 0 when δb ≥ 0.
The second-order condition for a maximum, πTbb < 0, is satisfied when ρbb ≤ 0; 
δb ≥ 0; and δbb ≥ 0. Turning to the comparative-static effects on the magnitude of 
the solicited bribe, we consider first the effect of agency competition.
2.2.1 effect of agency competition on the bribe demanded
As mentioned above, agency competition can change when more government ser-
vices are transacted on the Internet. Also, the restructuring of government agen-
cies and their responsibilities has been especially prevalent in transition nations, 
particularly in the early transition years. Employing the implicit function rule, 
gives the following relation
(∂b/∂n) = – πTbn / πTbb  (7)
Given the second-order condition, the sign of (∂b/∂n) would be the same as the 
sign of πTbn. From (7)
πTbn = (1–γ)[ ρn(Sδb + 1) + ρbn(Sδ + (S + b))]  (7A)
πTbn < 0 when ρbn ≤ 0. Under these conditions, greater agency competition reduces 
the magnitude of solicited bribes – competition works, even in markets for corrupt 
deals.12 Competition lowers the probability of a deal and affects the marginal ef-
fect of the bribe demanded on the deal probability (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
Accordingly, an increase in competing agencies (a greater number of jurisdi-
ctions) sufficiently lowers the expected payoffs from corruption and induces the 
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217bureaucrat to demand a lower bribe. While Svensson (2005) and others (e.g., Goel 
and Nelson, 2011) have discussed why corruption might diminish with greater 
competition, this research focuses on the severity of corruption. 
2.2.2 effect of higher probability of apprehension on bribe demanded
Effective internal affairs departments can increase apprehension probabilities for 
corrupt police departments. To determine the effect of higher apprehension prob-
ability (γ) on the bribe demanded, we have
Sign (∂b/∂γ) = Sign πTbγ  (8)
where 
 πTbγ = – ρ(Sδb + 1) – ρb (S + b + Sδ) (8A)
πTbγ < 0 when [(Sδb + 1)b/(Sδ + b + S)] > –ερ > 0
In other words, harsher punishments lower the bribe demanded when the elasti city 
of deal (acceptance) probability is modest. Intuitively, the bribe taker might ex-
pect a lower bribe demand to generate a smaller response (relative inelasticity) in 
the probability of a corrupt deal when the bribe giver expects a political regime 
change that might yield more favorable future outcomes (read cleaner govern-
ment). For instance, “lame duck” bureaucrats can expect lower responsiveness to 
their bribe demands.13 
2.2.3 effect of a change in bureaucratic compensation
Next we study the effect of an increase in the bureaucrat’s salary on the size of the 
bribe demanded. Bureaucratic salaries are often set and changes have often to be 
approved by legislatures. Proceeding in the same manner as before
Sign (∂b/∂S) = Sign πTbS (9)
where 
      πTbS = – δbz2 + ρb(1–γ)[1 + δ] < 0 with δb ≥ 0,  (9A)
or with second-order conditions.  
Higher salaries make bribe demands less attractive – there is some substitution 
between legal income and corrupt earnings. Goel and Rich (1989) provide some 
related evidence from the United States.
13 Alternately, the probability of securing the deal might not change very much with the bribe demanded when 
the favor offered by the bureaucrat is uniform and each favor seeker can obtain fixed units – e.g., one permit/
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218 To summarize, we have considered different cases allowing the bribe giver to 
initiate the corrupt relation by offering a bribe, and then alternately allowing a 
bureaucrat to initiate by soliciting a bribe. In all scenarios, the focus has been on 
determining the severity of corruption. We find that anti-corruption policies are 
effective in reducing the severity of corruption under certain circumstances. The 
concluding section follows.
3 concluding remarks
Formal economics research on criminal behavior dates back to the seminal work 
of Becker (1968); however, research on corruption is more recent (see Lambs-
dorff, 2006; Treisman, 2007). In this context, theoretical work has somewhat 
lagged behind empirical investigations of corruption. This paper develops a sim-
ple model to examine the effects on the severity of corruption when bribe takers 
or bribe givers initiate corrupt deals. While the extant literature has largely fo-
cused on the prevalence of corruption (e.g., Priks, 2012; Svensson, 2005), rather 
than its severity, these scenarios are consistent with collusion among bribe takers 
and bribe givers and with extortion by bureaucrats (Ahlin and Bose, 2007; Mishra, 
2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; 1999). For instance, the 
first mover in corrupt relations might emerge due to numerous factors including 
the relative discount rates of the two parties, relative bargaining positions, degree 
of competition, socio-cultural norms, etc. Both parties weigh the relative costs and 
benefits of their actions including factoring in that the corrupt relation might not 
be acceptable to the other party and that there is some risk of apprehension and 
consequent punishment (figures 1 and 2).
Two scenarios of corrupt dealings are considered: (1) a competitive bribe giver 
moves first (e.g., bribes offered to buy a place in the queue); and (2) a competitive 
bribe taker moves first (e.g., offers by bureaucrats to collude with bribe givers). 
Generally, the timing of bribes is not empirically observable, unless one has ac-
cess to data on individual bribe transactions. In an interesting recent study, Goel et 
al. (2013) were able to analyze such data from Croatia. Besides this novelty, cor-
ruption issues in Croatia are interesting due it being a transition country. The au-
thors show how a monopolist bureaucrat is able to affect the timing and the nature 
of bribes.
Results show that positive bribes are forthcoming when punishments and bureau-
cratic salaries are low. When the bribe giver initiates the corrupt deal, greater 
competition among favor seekers lowers the bribe offered provided the marginal 
effect of the bribe is somewhat insensitive to competition. In the context of the 
literature, we are able to show the effect of competition on the severity of corrup-
tion, rather than on its prevalence (Svensson, 2005). Apprehension is shown to be 
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219With the bribe taker initiating the corrupt deal, greater competition among govern-
ment agencies (competing jurisdictions) lowers the bribe demanded again when 
the deal probability is relatively inflexible to agency competition.14 Greater ap-
prehension probability lowers the bribes demanded when the probability of secur-
ing the corrupt deal is somewhat unresponsive (inelastic) to the bribe demanded. 
The probability of securing the deal might not change very much with the bribe 
demanded when, with a given number of jurisdictions, the favor offered by the 
bureaucrat is uniform and each favor seeker can obtain fixed units – e.g., one per-
mit/license per person, one preferred parking permit, etc. Alternately, a “lame 
duck” bureaucrat can expect lower responsiveness from the bribe giver to her 
bribe demands.15 Finally, consistent with intuition, higher bureaucratic salaries 
reduce bribe demands.
Besides contributing to the literature, this work has some policy value. In the ab-
sence of the ability to eradicate corruption universally, policymakers might look 
to make it somewhat benign by lowering its severity. Greater competition among 
bribe takers and bribe givers reduces the bribes – thus making bribes more afford-
able for more givers.16 In general, apprehension is shown to be effective no matter 
who initiates the corrupt deal. However, for this to happen, a “clean” judiciary 
seems necessary. Similar results are also seen with greater agency competition, 
although it may be more expensive in some cases to maintain competing agencies. 
Further, increases in bureaucratic salaries to keep them at somewhat on a par with 
their private sector counterparts seem to constitute an effective counter-corruption 
strategy (see Goel and Rich, 1989).
In closing, some potential extensions to this work are suggested. One limitation of 
this analysis is that repeated corrupt interaction between the parties is not consid-
ered, which might lead to reputation effects (Andrianova, 2001; Basu et al., 1992; 
Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006; Dixit, 2004; Yoo, 2008). One could also include 
a middleman in corrupt dealings (see Bertrand et al., 2007; Guriev, 2004; Lambs-
dorff and Teksoz, 2004). Second, the model considered in this study is a partial 
equilibrium one and social welfare implications of changes in corruption are not 
formally considered. Further, access to micro-level data might enable one to test 
some of the assumptions of this study (see Goel et al., 2012; 2013; Mocan, 2008). 
Finally, a simplification is the consideration of a single window for the bribe. In 
practice a series of bribes might have to be paid to accomplish one corrupt deal.
14 In different settings, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Priks (2012) have shown that greater competition might 
not necessarily lower corruption.
15 As a practical matter, however, this elasticity may be difficult to observe for enforcement bodies, although 
one can expect the elasticity to change when bureaucrats face the end of their tenures, voluntarily or otherwise.
16 This policy implication is somewhat tempered by the fact that in practice not all anti-corruption agencies 
might be completely independent or have corruption reduction as their sole objective – i.e., they might 
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